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I.
A.

ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
A former party to this litigation, Dr. Richard Allen, D.P.M. ("Dr. Allen") is a

podiatrist who owns and operates an independent podiatry practice. Dr. Allen treated a
patient named Harvey Wainio on three occasions in January of 2010. The first two visits
took place in Dr. Allen's private office. During his first visit with Dr. Allen, Mr. Wainio
(now deceased) complained of a painful bunion and hammertoes. The pain had reduced
him to wearing house slippers rather than shoes and limited his activity, as he was unable
to stand or walk for lengths of time.
After performing a physical examination and evaluating x-rays Dr. Allen
recommended surgery. Mr. Wainio asked that the surgery take place as soon as possible.
A pre-operative visit took place on January 18, 2010. Dr. Allen's physical examination of
Mr. Wainio revealed strong pulses in the lower extremities. Surgery took place on January
21, 2010 at Syringa Surgical Center ("Syringa"). After the procedure Mr. Wainio
experienced inadequate blood flow to his right foot. His foot became necrotic, and
ultimately, he underwent a below the knee amputation of his right leg. Two-and-a-half
years later, I'v1r. Wainio passed away. The Appellants contended that Mr. Wainio's demise
was related to the January 21, 20 IO procedure.
The Appellants claimed that Dr. Allen should not have performed the January 21,
2010 surgery on Mr. Wainio, because he (Wanio) lacked adequate blood perfusion to his
right foot. The Appellants' position was directly contradicted by Dr. Allen's chart notes
and sworn deposition testimony, in which he confirmed the existence of adequate pedal

pulses. Finding themselves unable to contradict Dr. Allen's subjective findings of adequate
perfusion - supported by Dr. Allen's contemporaneous chart notes and sworn testimony
the Appellants pursued the theory that Dr. Allen did not or could not have palpated pulses.
In an effort to support their argument, the Appellants attempted to capitalize on the
fact that Dr. Allen had undergone inpatient treatment for drug abuse. Dr. Allen had
successfully completed a 60-day inpatient drug treatment program several months prior to
his first encounter with Mr. Wainio. The Appellants conducted far-reaching discovery into
the nature and extent of Dr. Allen's abuse of controlled substances. Ultimately, however,
the Appellants could not uncover any evidence that Dr. Allen's addiction continued after
his inpatient treatment was successfully completed. Undeterred, the Appellants hired an
anesthesiologist, Dr. Paul Wischmeyer, M.D. as an expert witness. Dr. Wischmeyer
contended that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that Dr. Allen "could" have relapsed,
which "would have'' impaired his ability to perceive Mr. Wainio's pulses. Dr. Wischmeyer
offered several speculative affidavits concerning Dr. Allen's alleged relapse. Dr. Allen and
several of his fellow employees conclusively testified that such a relapse did not occur. The
trial court excluded the evidence under IRE 402-403 and 702.
The Appellants did not initially contend that Syringa was independently negligent.
Rather, the Appellants contended that Dr. Allen was an actual or apparent agent of Syringa,
and thus, pursued Syringa under respondeat superior liability. However, the uncontroverted
record before the trial court showed that Dr. Allen was not an employee of Syringa, and
that he did not hold himself out as an agent of Syringa. Both of the pre-operative visits
during which Dr. Allen was allegedly negligent occurred at Dr. Allen's private office. Mr.
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Wainio, for his part, had never heard of "Syringa" and at all times believed that he was
being treated by Dr. Allen. Indeed, he was referred specifically by a physician to Dr. Allen
by name. The Appellants pointed to Dr. Allen's privileges to perform surgery at Syringa
and ownership stake in Syringa as evidence of agency. The trial court found that the
Appellants failed to satisfy their burden of proof against Syringa under IRCP 56, and
dismissed the claims against Syringa.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
Appellants Harvey Wainio and Beatrice Shatto (the wife of Mr. Wainio) filed suit

on March 9, 2011 against Syringa Surgical Center, LLC and Dr. Richard M. Allen, D.P.M.
R. Vol. I, p. 48-54. The Appellants contended that Dr. Allen failed to comply with the

applicable standard of care for a podiatrist, which led to the loss of Mr. Wainio's lower
right leg. Id. at p. 51-52. The Appellants further contended that Dr. Allen's violation of the
standard of care occurred "as an agent, employee and/or servant of Syringa Surgical
Center." Id. at 51, paragraph 3.2.
In January of 2013, the Appellants were granted leave of court to amend their
Complaint to assert a wrongful death claim against the defendants, to add Jennifer Viveros
(daughter of Harvey Wainio) as a plaintiff, and to substitute the Estate of Harvey Wainio
for Harvey Wainio as a plaintiff. R. Vol. I, p. 460-468. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint
was filed on January 15, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 497-504. In their First Amended Complaint,
the Appellants contended that Syringa had a duty to monitor its ·'agents," including Dr.
Allen, to ensure that he was not impaired. R. Vol. I, p. 500. Further, Appellants alleged

3

that Syringa had a duty to monitor its drug inventory to assure that its drugs "were not
being improperly misused by its agents, employees or physicians." Id.
On January 23, 2014, Dr. Allen filed a Motion in Li mine to Exclude All Evidence
of Drug Use or Abuse. R. Vol. I, p. 1365-1388. Dr. Allen argued: (1) there was no evidence
that Dr. Allen was using drugs or impaired when he was treating for or operating on Mr.
Wainio (i.e., the evidence was not relevant), (2) any slight probative value of the drug abuse
evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such testimony, (3)
plaintiffs' expert Dr. Paul Wischmeyer's opinions concerning Dr. Allen's drug use were
inadmissible speculation under IRE 702, and (4) the "failure to monitor" or "failure to
safeguard" arguments against Syringa were likewise inadmissible for reasons (l)-(3),
supra. Id. Syringajoined Dr. Allen's Motion and filed its own briefing on the issues raised

therein. R. Vol. I, p. 1561-1574. Syringa further argued that Dr. Wischmeyer's untimely
opinions violated the rules of discovery and the expert witness disclosure deadlines set by
the trial court in accordance vvith IRCP 26(b)( 4). Id. at 1568.
The Appellants submitted two Affidavits from Dr. Wischmeyer in opposition to Dr.
Allen and Syringa' s Motion. The first, dated October 19, 2012 contended that there was "a
reasonable likelihood that Dr. Allen could have relapsed in use of either opiates or
Propofol, which would of impaired his perception and/or ability to appropriately care for
and evaluate Mr. Wainio." R. Vol. I, p. 1157-1558 (emphasis added). The Appellants also
submitted an Affidavit from Ms. Shatto dated January 28, 2014 in which she claimed to
have "attended the pre-surgical visit with Dr. Allen," during which she observed "jerky
movements" by Dr. Allen, and "glittery eyes." R. Vol. I, p. 1682 (emphasis added). Ms.
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Shatto had previously testified that she did not attend or did not recall the January 18, 2010
visit, as she was busy that day. R. Vol. I, p. 1919.
Dr. Wischmeyer submitted another Affidavit dated February 3, 2014, in which he
testified that Ms. Shatto's Affidavit describing "glittery eyes" and '·jerky movements"
along with Dr. Allen's previous drug abuse and family history demonstrated that Dr. Allen
"relapsed and was under the influence of drugs at the time of his preoperative evaluation
of Mr. Wainio on January 18, 2010." R. Vol. I, p. 1711. However, Dr. Wischmeyer's
Affidavit was factually incorrect on its face. Ms. Shatto did not attend the January 18,2010
pre-surgical visit. R. Vol., I, p. 2257. While Ms. Shatto's Affidavit claimed that she
attended '·the'' pre-surgical visit, she testified in her deposition that the only time she was
in the presence of Dr. Allen was on the January 4, 2010 visit. Id. at p. 2257, FN 2. Dr.
Wischmeyer' s Affidavit made no mention of intoxication, relapse, or impairment on either
January 4, 2010 or January 21, 2010.
On February 19, 2014, the court issued an "Opinion and Order on Pretrial Motions,"
which addressed the drug use/abuse issue. R. Vol. I, p. 2254-2259. The trial court granted
Dr. Allen's and Syringa's Motion in Limine. Id. In doing so, the trial court concluded that
Dr. Wischmeyer's opinions amounted to speculation and conjecture, lacking sufficient
foundation. R. Vol. I, p. 2257-2258. Next, the trial court found that even if Dr.
Wischmeyer· s opinions were relevant, any such probative value was substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and
the potential for undue delay. Id.
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On September 10, 2014, Defendant Syringa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
contending that Syringa should be dismissed because no act or omission of Dr. Allen was
performed as an actual or apparent agent of Syringa. R. Vol. I, p. 2646-2658. The
Appellants responded by arguing that a question of fact existed as to whether Dr. Allen
acted as an agent of Syringa when he was allegedly negligent, and second, Syringa was
negligent in connection with Dr. Allen's alleged drug use.
The trial court granted Syringa's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding as
follows:
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs' allegation is that Dr. Allen was
negligent in claiming he felt a pedal pulse in Wainio's right foot,
as Wainio's circulation was too occluded for a pedal pulse to have
been detected, and that as a result of Dr. Allen's negligence, he
determined Wainio had sufficient blood flow for post-surgical
healing to occur, when in fact there was insufficient blood flow.
Under the facts in the record, Plaintiffs have alleged no negligent
conduct by Dr. Allen at any time on the day of, or during, the
surgical procedure itself. Nor have they alleged any negligence by
any Syringa employee or independent contractor providing
services for Syringa. In order for Syringa to be vicariously liable
for Dr. Allen's alleged act of negligence, which occurred in the
office of his private practice during a pre-surgery exam, there
would have to be a principal/agent relationship between Syringa
and Dr. Allen relative to Allen's private medical practice. The
record is void of any facts that any such agency - express, implied,
or apparent was created between Dr. Allen and Syringa relative
to Dr. Allen's private medical practice.
R. Vol.

L p. 3040-3041.
Finally, on October 27, 2014, despite the trial court's prior order excluding such

evidence, Appellants filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of Dr. Allen's
drug use. R. Vol. I, p. 2728. The trial court denied the Appellants' motion on November
19, 2014. R. Vol. I, 3030-3035.
6

The claims brought against Dr. Allen were settled prior to trial and the claims
against him were dismissed. R. Vol. I, p. 3117-3118. The claims belonging to Ms. Viveros
expired upon her death. Id. at 3. Judgment was entered in Syringa's favor on January 30,
2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 3120.

C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Formation of Syringa and Treatment of Mr. Wainio.

Syringa Surgical Center, LLC was formed in 2004 by Steven Ozeran, M.D. and
Richard Allen. D.P.M. R. Vol. I, p. 2683-2684. Dr. Ozeran, a plastic surgeon, and Dr.
Allen, a podiatrist retained their independent practices. Id. Beginning in 2009, a third owner
joined Dr. Ozeran and Dr. Allen, making each a one-third owner of Syringa. R. Vol. I, p.
2687, 2697. The surgical center is used by other podiatrists, plastic surgeons and oral
surgeons. ld. Syringa is an ambulatory surgical center (or "day surgery" center). R. Vol. I,
p. 2691-2692. Only outpatient procedures are performed at Syringa. R. Vol I, p. 2696. Dr.
Allen is not an employee of Syringa. R. Vol. I, p. 2708. Dr. Allen had privileges to perform
outpatient procedures at Syringa. R. Vol. I., p. 2871.
Mr. Wainio was referred to Dr. Allen by Dr. Sigler to "fix [his] toes so [he] could
walk better." R. Vol. L p. 2679. Prior to his first visit with Dr. Allen, Mr. Wainio had never
heard of Syringa Surgical Center. had never been there, and did not "choose to see Dr.
Allen in any way. shape or form because of his relationship to Syringa Surgical Center."
R. Vol. I, p. 2651, 2903.
Mr. Wainio's first visit with Dr. Allen was on January 4, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 2674.
The January 4. 2010 visit took place at Dr. Allen's private office. R. Vol. L p. 499 at 2.4.
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Mr. Wainio's second visit with Dr. Allen- likewise at Dr. Allen's private office

occurred

on January 18, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 2651, 2674, 2695. On January 21, 2010, after two preoperative visits, Dr. Allen performed surgery to treat a bunion on Mr. Wainio's right foot.
R. Vol. I., p. 2416. The procedure was performed at Syringa Surgical Center. R. Vol. I, p.
2279.
The parties generally agree that prior to performing such procedures, a podiatrist
should confirm that blood perfusion to the lower extremities exists. Dr. Allen contends that
during a pre-operative examination of Mr. Wainio, he (Dr. Allen) verified the existence of
adequate pedal pulses by palpation. R. Vol. I, p. 2004.
After the procedure, Mr. Wainio had or developed inadequate blood flow to his
right foot. Vol. L p. 2279. His foot became necrotic, and ultimately, he underwent a below
the knee amputation of his right leg. R. Vol. I., p. 2279. Some two-and-a-half years after
the procedure, during the course oflitigation, Mr. Wainio passed away. R. Vol. I., p. 2279.
The Appellants contend that Mr. Wainio' s demise was put into motion by the January 21,
2010 procedure. Id
2.

Dr. Allen's Drug Use and Treatment.

Beginning in February or March of 2009, Dr. Allen became addicted to Propofol.
R. Vol. I, p. 1405 at 2. Dr. Allen testified that he last took Propofol in August of 2009. R.

Vol. I, p. 1405. On September 11, 2009, Dr. Allen admitted himself to inpatient treatment
at Hazelden treatment facility in Newberg, Oregon. Id. at 4. He successfully completed
treatment on November 17, 2009. Id. at 4 and p. 1418. The medical director of the facility
recommended that Dr. Allen resume normal working duties on November 30, 2009. R.
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Vol. I, p. l 418. Dr. Allen has not used Propofol since that time, and did not suffer from
any impairment or lingering effects from his Propofol use since that time. R. Vol.

L p. 1405

at 5.
Once Dr. Allen completed rehabilitation in November of 2009, he voluntarily
initiated regular meetings with a substance abuse counselor, Diana Pals. R. Vol. I, p. 1421
at 2, 4. Ms. Pals has over thirty (30) years of experience in substance abuse counseling. Id.
at 3. Dr. Allen voluntarily agreed to counseling, to undergo random drug testing, and
participated in both spiritual and self-help groups. R. Vol. I, p. 1421-1422 at 5. Dr. Allen
underwent 63 random drug tests between December 10, 2009 and August 7, 2012, all of
which were determined to be negative. R. Vol. I, p. 3034 at FN 2; 887-949.
Percipient witnesses to Dr. Allen's prior drug use uniformly testified that there was
absolutely no evidence of a relapse by Dr. Allen:
•

Richard Snyder, the Director of Surgical Services for Syringa testified that Since
September of 2009, he had no concerns about Dr. Allen abusing drugs. R. Vol. I,
p. 1369. Mr. Snyder implemented corrective measures in the surgical center,
including a double-lock system and daily drug counts which never showed a
discrepancy. Id. He attended most surgeries at Syringa and never saw Dr. Allen in
an impaired state. Id. Mr. Snyder was present on the date of Mr. Wainio's surgery
and noticed no sign of impairment. Id.

•

Monica Broerneling was an assistant at Dr. Allen's office, including in 2010. Id.
She \vorked right alongside Dr. Allen and had no suspicion or concern that Dr.
Allen had relapsed or had begun using drugs. Id.
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•

Heidi Pritchett, an office medical assistant who worked in Dr. Allen's office never
saw Dr. Allen in a state which suggested he could not take care of a patient. Id.

•

Sherri Allen, Dr. Allen's wife and office manager testified that after Dr. Allen
returned from Hazelden, she has had no concerns that he was using drugs and was
confident that he was not using drugs anymore. Id. at 1370.

In September of 2010, Dr. Allen entered into a Stipulation and Consent Order before the
Board of Podiatry, State ofidaho. R. Vol. I, p. 1405 at 3. The Consent Order required drug
counseling, urine drug screening, physician recovery group meetings, 12-step meetings,
and meetings with an addiction sponsor. Id. In 2013, the Idaho Board of Podiatry ended
Dr. Allen's three year term of probation early based upon the recommendation of Dr.
Allen's treatment providers. R. Vol. I, p. 1438-1439.

II.
A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Trial Judge Correctly Granted Syringa's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Appellants contend that summary judgment in Syringa's favor was inappropriate

for three reasons: (1) the trial court failed to appreciate the scope of Appellants' negligence
allegations, (2) any negligence by Dr. Allen should be attributed to Syringa under a theory
of actual or (3) apparent authority, and (4) Syringa was negligent in its "complicity" with
Dr. Allen's drug use. Appellant's [sic] Opening Brief ("Opening Brief'), pgs. 15-27.
The trial court correctly identified the factual and legal deficiencies in Wainio's
claims. Appellants failed to provide admissible evidence establishing the standard of care
Syringa was obliged to follow, a violation of that standard, and any injury or damage
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proximately caused by the same. Instead, Appellants exclusively relied upon their flawed
allegations of negligence against Dr. Allen under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

1.

The Trial Court Fairly Construed Wainio's Negligence Claims.

Appellants contend the trial court misinterpreted their allegations against Dr. Allen
and/or Syringa, which resulted in an erroneous summary judgment ruling. Specifically,
they argue that the trial court failed to appreciate their allegation that Dr. Allen was
negligent on the day of the surgery, January 21, 2010. Opening Brief, p. 15. Appellants'
argument is a red herring. They claim that Dr. Allen was not only negligent during the preoperative visits (January 4 and 18 2010) during which he determined that Wainio was a
surgical candidate, but also on the date of the surgery, because "it was negligent to do the
surgery at Syringa Surgical Center because he was not a surgical candidate." Opening
Brief, p. 17. This is precisely the same negligence as alleged on January 4 and 18 2010.
That is, the contention that "Mr. Wainio did not have the requisite pulses in the lower
extremity" to proceed with surgery. Id.
The pre-surgical examination of Mr. Wainio took place on January 18, 2010, at Dr.
Allen's private office. R. Vol. I, p. 2004. The evaluation included an evaluation of pulses.
Dr. Allen's note read: "pulses strong both posterior tibial and dorsalis pedis bilateral.
Capillary refill three seconds." R. Vol. I, p. 2004. Appellants hired expert witness Albert
Burns, D.P.M. who concluded that Dr. Allen's January 18, 2010 note indicating the
presence of pedal pulses was ·'physically impossible." R. Vol. I, p. 2008. There is no
evidence that Dr. Allen re-evaluated Mr. Wainio for pedal pulses on January 21, 2010.
There was no expert ,vitness testimony suggesting that Dr. Allen was required by virtue of
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the standard of care to re-evaluate pedal pulses on that date, that he did so, or that he did
so negligently. Regardless, as set forth, infra, the Appellants failed to prove that Dr. Allen's
actions or omissions were performed as an actual or apparent agent of Syringa.
Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that Appellants' claims against Syringa
failed as a matter of law.
Appellants argumentatively assert that the trial court "conced[ ed] that [Syringa]
could be vicariously liab(le] for Dr. Allen's negligent conduct in the context of his role as
a medical staff member or owner..." Opening Brief, p. 16. Appellants' assertion is
incorrect. Rather, the trial court concluded that "Any agency relationship that exists
between Syringa and Dr. Allen is limited to Dr. Allen's conduct as a medical staff member
or owner of Syringa." R. Vol. I, p. 3041. The trial court did not find that any actions taken
by Dr. Allen in this case were undertaken on Syringa's behalf

2.

Apelian ts Failed to Generate an Issue of Fact on the Claim of Actual
or Apparent Authority of Dr. Allen.

Idaho Code § 6-1012 permits a plaintiff to bring an action against a healthcare
provider or any person vicariously liable for the provider's negligence. Although the term
'·vicarious liability" is not defined under I.C. §6-1012, it is defined generally as "liability
that a supervisory party bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate based
on the relationship between the two parties." Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp.,
147 Idaho 109,115,206 P.3d 473,479 (2009) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 934 (8th
ed.2004)). The burden of proof was described by the Jones Court as follows:
When a hospital is being sued in its capacity as an individual
healthcare provider, the plaintiff is still required to prove that the
hospital breached the applicable standard of care through expert
12

testimony. On the other hand, when a hospital is being sued in its
capacity as the principal, the plaintiff is required to prove that the
hospital's agent is a healthcare provider as required under the
statute, and that the agent breached the applicable standard of care.
Thus, the hospital is held vicariously liable for its agent's
negligence to the same extent as if the hospital itself breached the
standard of care under the Act.
The burden of establishing an agency relationship is on the party asserting it.
Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 117, 898 P.2d 43 (1995). Agency

is a relationship resulting from "the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to
act." Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 973, 719 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1986)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 1, at 7 (1958)). "It is axiomatic that an agency
relationship is created where one who hires another has retained a contractual right to
control the other's manner of performance." Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,
303, 796 P.2d 506 (1990).
An agency relationship can take three forms: express authority, implied authority,
and apparent authority. Id at 116. The interrelated nature of the first two categories express and implied authority - was described in Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497-98,
708 P.2d 900. 902-03 (1985) as follows:
Both express and implied authority are forms of actual authority.
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has
explicitly granted the agent to act in the principal's name. Implied
authority refers to that authority "which is necessary, usual, and
proper to accomplish or perform" the express authority delegated
to the agent by the principal.
See Also, Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P.2d 697 (1997).
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"Express authority may be found when there is evidence that the principal has
explicitly granted the agent authority to act in the principal's name." Tri-Circle, Inc. v.
Brugger Corp., 121 Idaho 950, 954, 829 P.2d 540, 544 (Ct. App. 1992). In the present case,
it was an uncontroverted fact that Dr. Allen was not an employee of Syringa. See, R. Vol.

L p. 2708. Dr. Allen had clinical privileges and was granted a medical staff appointment at
Syringa. R. Vol. L p. 2871. However, pursuant to Syringa's bylaws, this simply meant that
he was granted permission to render surgical services at the Syringa facility. R. Vol. I, p.
2877.
There is no evidence in the record that Dr. Allen performed the January 21, 2010
surgery on Syringa' s behalf or in Syringa' s name. Rather, Dr. Allen simply had permission
to use Syringa's facility for outpatient procedures. With respect to Dr. Allen's role as a
member of the limited liability corporation, bis role was that of a member-manager, not a
medical practitioner. R. Vol. I, p. 2711, 2860. There was no evidence that Syringa dictated
the manner in which Dr. Allen evaluated patients, conducted pre-surgical screens,
approved patients for surgery, or the manner in which he conducted surgery. That is,
Syringa did not exercise control over Dr. Allen in connection with his work as a podiatrist.
Further, the Appellants failed to provide evidence that Dr. Allen's conduct was
pursuant to any express or implied authority granted to him by Syringa. In fact, all of the
conduct of which the Appellants complain - approving or agreeing to perform surgery on
Mr. Wainio despite the alleged absence of perfusion

occurred prior to (January 4 and 18,

2010) Mr. Wainio ever entering Syringa Surgical Center on January 21, 2010.
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3.

Dr. Allen Did Not Act With Apparent Authority When Treating Mr.
\Vainio.

Standing in contrast to actual authority is apparent authority, which exists when a
principal voluntarily places the purported agent in such a position that a person of ordinary
prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is
justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority. Bailey v. Ness,
109 Idaho 495, 497-98, 708 P.2d 900, 902-03 (1985).
Apparent authority is ''created when the principal 'voluntarily places an agent in
such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and
the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant
to existing authority.'" Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495,497, 708 P.2d 900 (1985) (quoting
Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278 (1972)) (emphasis in original). Apparent
authority cannot be created by the acts and statements of the agent alone. Id. at 497-98.
"[W]here the existence of an agency relationship is disputed - whether or not there is
apparent authority on the agent's part to act as he acted- it is a question for the trier of fact
to resolve from the evidence." Id. at 498 (citations omitted). However, where the facts
presented are undisputed, a factual question may be resolved by the court as a question of
la\V. See Borah v. lvfcCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79, 205 P.3d 1209 (2009).
Establishing apparent authority requires proof of two elements: (1) conduct by the
principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe that another person acts on the
principal's behalf, i.e., conduct by the principal "holding out" that person as its agent; and
(2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably believes it is rendered on behalf
of the principal. Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 116, 206
15

P.3d 473 (2009). A plaintiff is also required to show a "reasonable belief that the actor
had authority to act on behalf of the principal that is traceable to the principal's
manifestations to the plaintiff"

Id. ( emphasis added). Apparent authority does not

presuppose the present or prior existence of an agency relationship. Id. at 113.
The Court in Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109,480, 206
P.3d 473 (2009), explicitly listed the elements of apparent authority in Idaho:
( l) conduct by the principal that would lead a person to reasonably
believe that another person acts on the principal' s behalf, i.e.,
conduct by the principal "holding out" that a person as its agent;
and (2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably
believes it is rendered on behalf of the principal.
Here, the Appellants failed to establish the first element of the apparent agency test, as all
of the acts identified by the Appellants as giving rise to such apparent agency were
performed by Dr. Allen, the alleged agent, not Syringa, the alleged principal. Additionally,
the location of Dr. Allen's office to Syringa is not sufficient to establish apparent agency.
To accept such an assertion would be to hold all entities within an office building as
apparent agents of one another simply because they share stairways. An informed consent
form with the header of "Syringa Medical Center" is not sufficient to establish that Dr.
Allen is S:rringa's agent as such forms are created and maintained pursuant to Idaho law.
I.C. § 39-4508
More importantly, there is absolutely no question that Mr. Wainio was not misled
or confused by the arrangement. Mr. Wainio at all times intended to be treated by Dr. Allen,
not Syringa. The Appellants attempts to establish the second element of apparent authority
failed based upon Mr. Wainio's own sworn testimony:
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Q: Prior to your first visit with Dr. Allen, had you ever been to
Syringa Surgical Center?
,A: No.
Q: Had you ever heard of Syringa Surgical Center?
A: No.

Q: Did you choose to see Dr. Allen in any way, shape or form
because of his relationship to Syringa Surgical Center?
A: No.
R. Vol. I, p. 2651, 2903 (emphasis added). It is clear Mr. Wainio did not accept Dr. Allen's
services based upon his "reasonable belief' Dr. Allen was providing his treatment on behalf
of Syringa. Mr. Wainio did not choose Syringa. Rather, Mr. Wainio chose Dr. Allen based
upon a referral to Dr. Allen. As such, the Appellants failed to establish the second element
of apparent agency before the trial court.

4.

The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Appellants' Arguments
Concerning a Theory of Independent Liability in Connection with
Drug Monitoring.

The February 3, 2014 Affidavit of Dr. Wischmeyer contended that Syringa was
somehow negligent in failing to "monitor" Dr. Allen to ensure that he was "unimpaired
and competent" and also to ensure that he was not diverting or misusing drugs. R. Vol. I,
p. 50 I. However, the Appellants offered no evidence that Dr. Allen diverted or misused
drugs belonging to Syringa in 2010. Further, as set forth at greater length, infi"a, there was
no evidence in the record establishing Appellants' contention that Dr. Allen was ·'impaired
at the time he conducted surgery on Mr. Wainio." Opening Brief, p. 28.
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All of the factual citations concerning knowledge on the part of Syringa employees
concerning Dr. Allen's drug use (Id.) relate to drug use prior to Dr. Allen undergoing
extensive drug rehabilitation, and prior to Dr. Allen's treatment of Mr. Wainio. (R. Vol. I,

p. 3017-3021).
In addition, Dr. Wischmeyer's conclusive testimony regarding the "standard of
care" for Syringa was unsupportable as a matter of Idaho law. Dr. Wischmeyer contended
that Syringa was negligent in several respects. R. Vol. I, p. 1708-1709. However, Dr.
Wischmeyer's testimony amounted to nothing more than conclusory allegations.
There was no indication whatsoever that Dr. Wischmeyer did anything to acquaint
himself with the local standard of care for a day-surgery center in central Idaho, or in the
region in which Lewiston, Idaho, is located. He obviously failed to contact any local
physicians or to inquire of the standard of care of day-surgery centers from any resource,
and the Appellants failed to provide any evidence that such foundation information was
unavailable.
"The plaintiff must offer expert testimony indicating that the defendant health care
provider negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice." Id.
citing Dule:ney v. St. Alphonsus Regional /vfedical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d 816,820
(2002). I.C. ~6- l O13 requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff lay a foundation

establishing that his or her expert witness possesses "actual knowledge of the applicable
community standard to which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed." Daniel v.
Inland Northwest Renal Care Group, 159 P.3d at 859.

. . . expert testimony offered via affidavit must be made on
personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in
18

evidence, and affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to
testify as to the matters contained in the affidavit.

Id. The A1cDaniels court excluded testimony of plaintiffs expert witness on affidavit
because none of the foundational requirements of Idaho statute had been met. Therein, the
plaintiff's expert did not demonstrate that he was familiar with the standard of care for that
particular health care provider as it existed in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, at the time of the
alleged negligence, nor did he even attempt to state how he became familiar with the
standard. Dr. Wischmeyer contended that he personally would find the alleged actions of
Syringa Surgical Center to be "reckless or grossly negligent" and yet he failed to
demonstrate that he is familiar with the standard of care for a day-surgery center under
similar circumstances anywhere, much less in central Idaho.
Idaho statute very clearly requires that:
In any case ... for damage due to injury to or death of any person,
brought against any ... other provider of health care, including ..
. any ... hospital ... , such claimant or plaintiff must, as an
essential part of his or her case in chie( affirmatively prove by
direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the confident
evidence, that such defendant then and there negligently failed to
meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the
community in which such care allegedly was or should have been
provided, as such standard existed at the time and place of the
alleged negligence of such ... hospital ... and as such standard
then and there existed with respect to the class of health care
provider that such defendant then and there belonged to and in
which capacity ... it was functioning. .. as used in this act, the
term "community" refers to that geographical area ordinarily
served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such
care was or allegedly should have been provided.
LC. §6-1012 (emphasis added). Appellants' provision of Dr. Wischmeyer's "opinions"
regarding Syringa Surgical Center completely failed to meet the requirements of this
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statute. With respect to Syringa, none of the Affidavits submitted by Dr. Wischmeyer,
mentioned anything about comparable day-surgery centers in the "geographical area"
served by any hospital in or around Lewiston, Idaho. Dr. Wischmeyer spoke in terms of
conclusions based only upon his own personal standards. However, there was no evidence
that Dr. Allen diverted medication from Syringa after completion of inpatient rehabilitation
and the speculative allegations concerning his alleged relapse are addressed, infra.
Likewise, the requisite standard of care and alleged breach is statutorily required in
Idaho, as follows:
The applicable standard of practice and such a defendant's failure
to meet said standard must be established in [medical malpractice]
cases by such a plaintiff by testimony of one ( 1) or more
knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses, and such expert
testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation
therefore is first laid, establishing ( a) that such an opinion is
actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said opinion can
be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and (c) that such
expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise
coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable said community
standard to which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed;
provided, this section shall not be construed to prohibit or
otherwise preclude a competent witness who resides elsewhere
from adequately familiarizing himself with the standards and
practices of ( a particular) such area and thereafter giving opinion
testimony in such trial.

I. C §6-1013. Because this is a medical malpractice case, the Appellants were required to
comply with I.C. §6-1012 and§ 6-1013. Litz v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282,283,955 P.2d
113. 114 ( 1997). The Appellants never disclosed testimony in compliance with the medical
negligence statute and therefore, the trial court was never faced with admissible evidence
on this issue. Summary judgment was properly granted.
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B.

The Trial Court Properly Excluded Evidence of Dr. Allen's Drug Use and
Speculation Concerning a "Relapse."
The Appellants suggest that the trial court adopted a "new evidentiary standard" for

the admissibility of evidence. Opening Brief~ p. 29. Contrary to their arguments

which

were also made before the trial court - the trial court evaluated the speculative testimony
of drug abuse and found that such speculative, indirect evidence should be excluded under
IRE 402, 403, and 702.
The trial court permitted open and robust discovery concerning Dr. Allen's drug
use. When the Appellants were unable to produce evidence that Dr. Allen had relapsed and
was impaired \Vhen he treated Mr. Wainio, the trial court excluded evidence of the drug
use. The trial court acted well within its discretion in doing so. However, even if the trial
court had admitted the drug evidence, the summary judgment analysis of the claims against
Syringa would not be altered. First, the only evidence in the record was the speculative
testimony of Dr. Wischmeyer, who opined that Dr. Allen "could" have relapsed based upon
his family history and his own drug history. He did not specify what type of drugs Dr. Allen
allegedly utilized to relapse or their source (given that Dr. Allen could no longer access
Syringa's drugs without the assistance and presence of another person). Second, Dr.
Wischmeyer's supplemental affidavit was factually incorrect, as it claimed that Ms.
Shatto's observations of Dr. Allen ("glittery eyes" and "jerky movements") supported the
idea that Dr. Allen had relapsed on January 18, 2010. However, as the trial court
recognized, Ms. Shatto was never in Dr. Allen's presence during that visit. Thus, there was
not a scintilla of evidence before the trial court - even including the speculative testimony
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of Dr. Wischmeyer

which advanced the theory that Dr. Allen was impaired during his

pre-surgical screen of Dr. Allen on January 18, 2010.

1.

Evidence of Drug Use Was Properly Excluded Under IRE 402-403.

"All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or
by other rules applicable in courts of [Idaho]. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible." IRE 402. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." IRE 403.
The trial court correctly analyzed the state of the record under IRE 403. The court
concluded that there was no reliable evidence suggesting that Dr. Allen was using or
abusing drugs in 2010 when he was treating Mr. Wainio, the evidence showed that Dr.
Allen was strictly monitored for drug use during the time period in which he treated Mr.
Wainio, and finally, even if evidence of prior drug use were relevant, such testimony was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury. R. Vol. I, p. 3034-3035.
Courts throughout the country have been cautious when faced with allegations
concerning prior drug or alcohol use by medical professionals in malpractice cases.
In Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So.2d 1314, 1317 (Miss. 1981 ), evidence of physician's
prior drug use excluded since "uncontradicted proof in the instant case is that Dr. Sheffield
had not taken drugs for a month and a half prior to the baby's birth or during care
administered while it was alive. \Ve think his previous history of drug abuse problems is
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too remote and disconnected with the negligence issue to be properly presented to the jury
in this case ... " relying on Standard Oil Co. v. Carter, 210 Ala. 572, 98 So. 575 (1923),
and State v. Dault, 19 Wn.App. 709, 578 P.2d 43 (1978).
In Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659, 661-662 (S.D. 1986), the appellate
court held affirmed the trial court's exclusion of evidence that the treating physician was
an alcoholic since the record did not include evidence "that alcohol had any effect on
diagnosis, treatment, preoperative or postoperative care," citing Mydlarz v. Palmeri

Duncan Const Co., 682 P.2d 695, 704 (Mont. 1984). In Mydlarz the Montana Supreme
Court held that a jury could be mislead even by the mention that the defendant was an
alcoholic, regardless of the defendant's condition at the time of the incident. Substituting
defendant Behrens' name for that of the defendant in Mydlarz, the South Dakota court
quoted ivfydlarz as follows:
Evidence that [Behrens] might have been an alcoholic when the
accident occurred may have some probative value regarding the
cause of the accident. However, the indirect relevance of this
evidence requires us to find that the probative value of the
evidence is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial effect on
lBehrens]. We find that the jury could have been mislead by
evidence indicating [Behrens] was an alcoholic and erroneously
presume the accident was caused by such disease.

A1ydlarz v. Palmeri Duncan Const. Co., 682 P.2d at 704. In this case Dr. Allen was
discharged from rehabilitation months before he treated Mr. Wainio. The fact that he was
once a drug user is highly inflammatory as opposed to any relevance that such evidence
may have. The introduction of Dr. Allen's history of drug use would most certainly
"mislead lthe jury] by evidence indicating [Dr. Allen] was an [a drug addictJ and
erroneously presume the accident was caused by such disease."

In Ornelas v. Fry. 151 Ariz. 324, 727 P.2d 819 (Ariz.App. 1986), the court excluded
evidence of defendant physician's "alcoholism" since the plaintiffs failed to produce
evidence that the alcoholism affected the physician's ability to comply with the applicable
standard of care at the time of treatment. Plaintiffs had submitted two "expert" affidavits
that concluded that the physician was "impaired" on the date of the surgery at issue, but the
court rejected that argument:
He hold as a matter of law that the fact Dr. Fry may have been an
alcoholic at the time of the surgery on Robert Ornelas does not
create in and of itself a separate issue or claim of negligence. It is
only when that alcoholism translates into conduct falling below
the applicable standard of care that it has any relevance. Here,
appellants were unable to furnish any evidence that at the time of
the alleged malpractice, Dr. Fry's performance was in any manner
impaired because of the use of alcohol. Thus, it was not error for
the trial court to deny the pre-trial motions to amend the complaint
and/or to reconvene the medical liability review panel.

Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d at 823.
In Shea v. Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130, 137 (Minn.App. 2001), evidence that a
physician had previously been professionally disciplined for writing prescriptions for
himself and for asking his colleagues to do so as well was excluded from trial since it
served no relevant purpose and was "very prejudicial." In Perryman v. DeKalb County

Hospital Authority, I 97 Ga.App. 505, 398 S.E.2d 745 (1990), the court excluded evidence
of "rumors" of physician's drug use as irrelevant to the issue of whether the physician was
competent to perform a certain procedure. In Yost v. Bermudez, 2003 WL 22941223 (Ohio
App. 2003), the court excluded evidence of a physician's involvement in a bar fight and
arrest for driving while intoxicated as irrelevant to medical malpractice claim.
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Other courts have noted that the purpose of rules regarding relevance and prejudice
are designed to prevent evidence "of scant ... probative force, dragged in by its heels for
the sake of its prejudicial effect." United States v. A1cRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.
1979). Such is precisely the case here.

2.

Dr. Wischmeyer's Opinions Were Properly Excluded.

Dr. Wischmeyer submitted an Affidavit dated October 19, 2012 in which he offered
the following opinion concerning relapse:
Given Dr. Allen's long term significant substance abuse of opiates
and Propofol, the inadequate amount of treatment time (60 days
instead of a more common length of stay for medical professionals
of 90 days), the failure of appropriate drug testing at the time of
admission to rehabilitation, the return to work one day after Dr.
Allen's discharge from rehabilitation (which was likely
inappropriate given Dr. Allen's long-standing IV drug/opiate
abuse) in conjunction with his family history of substance abuse
and concomitant psychological diagnosis of depression, and
finally, the apparent inability to appreciate the absence of pedal
pulses ... it is my opinion on a more probable than not basis that
there is a reasonable likelihood that Dr. Allen could have
relapsed in use of either opiates or Propofol, which would of
impaired his perception and/or ability to appropriately care for and
evaluate Mr. Wainio.
R. Vol. I, p. 1157-1558 (emphasis added).
Dr. Wischmeyer submitted another Affidavit dated February 3, 2014. Dr.
Wischmeyer testified that Ms. Shatto's Affidavit describing "glittery eyes" and "jerky
movements'' along with Dr. Allen's previous drug abuse and family history demonstrated
that Dr. Allen ''relapsed and was under the influence of drugs at the time of his preoperative
evaluation of Mr. Wainio on January 18, 2010." R. Vol. I, p. 1711. As the trial court
correctly recognized, Dr. Wischmeyer's Affidavit was factually incorrect. Ms. Shatto was
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not present at the January 18,2010 pre-surgical visit. R. Vol., I, p. 2257. While Ms. Shatto's
Affidavit claimed that she attended "the" pre-surgical visit, she testified in her deposition
that the on(v time she was in the presence of Dr. Allen was on the January 4, 2010 visit.
Id. at p. 2257, FN 2. Dr. Wischmeyer's Affidavit made no mention of intoxication, relapse,
or impairment on either January 4, 2010 or January 21, 2010.
The trial court correctly concluded that Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony proffered in
his October 19, 2012 Affidavit was "triple-qualified." R. Vol. I, p. 3034. Dr. Wischmeyer's
opinion was not offered on a more probable than not basis, but rather, it was probable that
there was a likelihood that Dr. Allen could have relapsed. Id.
With respect to Dr. Wischmeyer's February 3, 2014 Affidavit, the trial court
properly exercised its gatekeeping function in excluding such testimony where it was
improperly based upon speculation and conjecture. "[E]xpert opinion which is speculative,
conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in
rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46-47,
844 P.2d 24 (1992). Testimony is speculative when it "theoriz[es] about a matter as to
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,
565, 97 P.3d 428,432 (2004). Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony is clearly a "theory" concerning
a matter upon which there is no direct evidence.

3.

Dr. \Vishmeyer's Testimonv \Vould Not Create a Question of Fact as
to Syringa.

As set forth above, Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony, even if admitted, would not create
a genuine issue of material fact precluding Syringa's Motion for Summary Judgment.
There remains no evidence in the record that Dr. Allen was impaired on the date that he
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performed surgery on Mr. Wainio at Syringa Surgical Center (January 21, 2010). Even if
there had been, the Appellants failed to prove that Dr. Allen was acting as an agent of
Syringa on that date. With respect to the pre-surgical visits, Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony
was clearly erroneous. There was no observation or testimony suggesting that Dr. Allen
was impaired on January 18, 2010, the date he documented finding pulses in Mr. Wainio's
right lower extremity. Rather, Dr. Wischmeyer erroneously concluded that Ms. Shatto
observed "glittery eyes" and "jerky movements" of Dr. Allen on that date, but the trial
court correctly recognized that those late-arriving observations were made on January 4,
2010, not January 18, 2010. As such, Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony was deeply flawed. The
prejudicial effect of such testimony substantially outweighed any possible probative value,
and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the same.

III.

CONCLUSION

Syringa respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's Opinion and Order
on Syringa Surgical Center's Motion for Summary Judgment dated November 26, 2014
(R. Vol. L p. 3037-3041) and its Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Re
Drug use and Motion for Permissive Appeal dated November 19, 2014 (R. Vol. I, p. 30303035).
Dated this 26th day of January, 2016.
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